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Proposal for a Stabilisation Fund 
for the EMU 
Bernard Delbecque1* 
CEPS Working Document No. 385 / October 2013 
he current economic downturn in the euro area reveals the cost of creating Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without a central fiscal capacity. This is a major 
weakness of the EMU architecture. In particular, in the absence of a central fiscal 
capacity, the lack of fiscal space associated with current fiscal positions limits the ability of 
automatic stabilisers to mitigate the social and economic costs of the recession. This is 
evident from Chart 1, which shows that the member countries with high levels of 
unemployment (i.e. Spain, Greece and Portugal) are also those countries that have little 
margin of manoeuvre to implement a counter-cyclical budgetary policy. Thanks to relatively 
low unemployment rates and budget deficits, northern euro-area countries are in a very 
different situation. One could argue that these countries should mitigate the impact of the 
adjustment efforts undertaken in southern Europe. This is not self-evident, however, because 
the operating rules of EMU do not foresee this level of solidarity between member countries.  
 
It does not seem realistic at this point that euro area countries would be willing to create a 
kind of United States of Europe. However, the President of the European Council and the 
Presidents of the European Commission, Eurogroup and European Central Bank (ECB) have 
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Chart 1: Government Budget Deficit and Unemployment Rate in 2012
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recognised that a fiscal capacity would facilitate adjustment to economic shocks and help 
prevent some countries from plunging into a bad equilibrium (see Van Rompuy, 2012). This 
proposal received a lukewarm welcome from the European Council, reflecting the fact that 
there is very limited appetite among member countries to accept greater pooling of fiscal 
competences and further integration of policy-making. Whilst this may be the political 
reality today, the level of federalism required to develop a shock-absorption capacity for 
EMU may be much smaller than is commonly believed. The proposal developed in this 
paper aims to demonstrate this point.  
Risk-Sharing Mechanisms in a Monetary Union 
Before EMU came into being, many studies were undertaken on how its members would 
adjust to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks after the adoption of the euro. Based on the 
conclusions of the traditional theory of optimal currency areas and the empirical analysis of 
existing currency unions, most studies drew the same main conclusion: because of low 
labour mobility and relative price adjustment, in the absence of interregional fiscal transfers 
or alternative adjustment mechanisms, asymmetric shocks within EMU were likely to lead to 
regional recessions and persistent differences in regional unemployment rates.2 The current 
crisis has highlighted the relevance of this conclusion and stimulated new research on 
adjustment mechanisms that could be embedded in the EMU architecture to improve its 
functioning. Without claiming to be exhaustive, this section provides an overview of recent 
studies in this area. 
Bordo et al. (2011) discuss the characteristics of a common fiscal policy framework that could 
have alleviated the consequences of the current crisis for EMU members. In light of the 
experience of five federal states (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany and the United States), 
the authors found that the fiscal capacity of the central government and the system of 
transfers and equalisation of incomes across regions in those countries have tended to be 
strengthened in response to deep economic crises. This process was part of the stabilisation 
process to improve the conditions of the most damaged regions. This pattern suggests that 
the recent global crisis might play a part in convincing European leaders of the need to equip 
EMU with an adjustment mechanism similar to those driving regional adjustment within 
existing monetary unions.  
Wolff (2012) discusses four options for stabilisation of asymmetric shocks within EMU: 
unemployment insurance, payments related to large deviations of potential output, the 
narrowing of large spreads and discretionary temporary transfer payments. Wolff recognises 
the need to progress in this direction within a framework that provides for adequate 
democratic legitimacy and control. He also agrees that a more ambitious European fiscal 
union is desirable to improve the functioning of EMU.  
Drèze & Durré’s (2013) proposal for coping with regional shocks consists of the adoption of 
an insurance mechanism under which each EMU member would issue long-term bonds 
indexed on its real national income. To ensure meaningful international risk-sharing, the 
stock of bonds issued should be sufficiently large, in the order of 36% of national incomes – a 
percentage close to that of public budgets in national income. The bonds would be pooled, 
and each country would receive a share of the pool with the present value equal to the 
present value of its own bonds.3  The impact of the mechanism is illustrated in various 
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simulations, which provide an overview of the transfers that EMU members would have 
received if the mechanism had been implemented since the start of EMU. De Grauwe (2013) 
suggests a simplified version of the mechanism under which each member country would i) 
issue bonds that would pay an interest rate equal to the national growth rate of GDP and be 
deposited into a common debt agency and ii) hold bonds issued by the agency that would 
pay an interest rate equal to the average growth rate of the euro area.  
Finally, Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013) analyse the properties and the effectiveness of a 
supranational fiscal stabilisation mechanism that would collect contributions as a share of 
each member state’s GNP and pay transfers to countries negatively hit by output shocks. The 
transfers would be proportional to the size of the shock, the relative size of the economy and 
the resources available in the fund. The stabilisation properties of the mechanism are studied 
for different measures of shocks: estimated serially uncorrelated shocks, output gaps and 
growth deviations from historical averages. The authors find that a gross contribution of 
about 1.5 to 2.5% of GNP could provide stabilisation on a par with the fiscal risk-sharing 
observed in Germany and other federally organised countries.  
An EMU Stabilisation Fund 
This section presents an alternative stabilisation mechanism to help EMU member countries 
and the euro area as a whole to adjust to economic shocks. The mechanism is based on the 
following arrangement: 
•  When the projected real GDP growth forecast is below the estimated long-term real 
GDP growth, euro-area countries would benefit from a disbursement from an EMU 
Stabilisation Fund (ESF). When the growth forecast is above the long-term real growth 
estimates, they would make a contribution to the ESF. The net contributions would be 
based on the country’s position in the economic cycle and the relative size of the 
economy. Conceptually, the following equation could serve as the basis for calculating 
the net contribution to the ESF: d = α (ye  – y*), where d is the net contribution 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, ye is the projected real GDP growth rate and y* is 
the projected long-term real GDP growth rate.  
•  Depending on the economic situation prevailing at the time of its creation, the ESF 
would start accumulating reserves if the contributions received from high-growth 
countries exceed the payments to be made to low-growth countries, or it would have to 
borrow from financial markets to be able to transfer resources to member countries if 
their total net contributions were negative, reflecting difficult economic circumstances. 
Overall, it can be expected that the ESF would reduce its debt or accumulate reserves 
during times of economic boom, and would use its reserves or issue bonds during an 
economic slowdown or recession.  
•  At the institutional level, the ESF could be managed by the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which could be given responsibility for investment and debt 
management, and by the European Commission, which could be entrusted with the 
task of assessing the member countries’ position in the economic cycle and the 
calculation of the net contributions to the ESF. 
As in the case of the mechanisms presented above, the ESF is an insurance-type system 
designed to act as a union-wide automatic stabiliser amidst macroeconomic shocks. Thanks 
to payments received from the ESF, a country could take fewer austerity measures in the face 
of a negative economic shock in order to achieve a given budget deficit. This would dampen 
movements in aggregate demand and stabilise regional unemployment. These goals could be 
reached without requiring the creation of a central budget or any transfer of sovereignty in 4 | BERNARD DELBECQUE 
 
budgetary and fiscal policy. In order to benefit from this kind of risk-sharing mechanism, 
member countries would agree to pay an ‘insurance premium’ to the ESF when growth 
exceeds long-term growth. These contributions would help cushion positive shocks by 
limiting the possibility of increasing public spending in good times when revenues turn out 
to be temporary.  
Rather than being based on the issuance of GDP-linked bonds, the ESF is grounded in a 
simpler approach that links the payments into and from the ESF to a measure of the 
countries’ business cycle. This would avoid the problem of getting governments to agree on 
an increase of their gross debts, and resolve issues concerning bonds indexed on national 
incomes. Whilst being close to the proposal of Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013), the ESF 
differentiates itself in different important ways: 
•  The ESF allows smoothing both negative and positive shocks. Treating both types of 
shocks symmetrically can be justified by the fact that periods of very rapid growth can 
create large imbalances, which can be the root cause of crises.  
•  The ESF addresses euro-area-wide shocks, i.e. shocks occurring simultaneously in all 
EMU member countries. With this feature, it exhibits the attributes of a federal budget 
by providing a stimulus during recessions by making transfers to all countries, and 
contributing to a more restrictive fiscal policy during booms by collecting ‘taxes’ from 
member states. Whilst monetary policy has an important role to play in addressing 
common shocks, the current crisis shows that the transmission of monetary policy in 
the EMU is not always as straightforward as one would hope, even when shocks affect 
all member countries, particularly when the lower zero bound is reached. The ESF 
would therefore contribute to reduce the pressure on the ECB and facilitate its mission 
as guardian of price stability. Furthermore, disbursements from the ESF during severe 
economic downturns would reduce the borrowing requirements of member countries 
and therefore the risk of tensions in capital markets caused by rising sovereign risk 
premia. 
•  The size of the transfers to countries in recession is not limited by the amount of 
contributions collected in periods of buoyant economic activity. This is made possible 
by the fact that the ESF would borrow in the market in bad times. 4 The simulations 
presented below show that the ESF could only take on a limited amount of debt. 
Indeed, as real economic growth should converge towards its long-term level, member 
countries’ net contributions to the ESF should also converge towards zero. Therefore, 
the level of assets/debt accumulated by the ESF should fluctuate in a relatively narrow 
band around zero.  
A potential criticism of the ESF is that it could reduce incentives to undertake sound 
economic policies given that it would compensate governments for low economic growth. 
The perceived safety created by insurance can indeed create a moral hazard problem. This 
problem tends to affect all the different risk-sharing mechanisms discussed above. Whilst 
warranting further consideration, the following arguments can be used to counter the 
criticism: 
•  The ESF would not cause permanent and unidirectional transfers from some countries 
to others. This is an essential difference with risk-sharing mechanisms that link the 
transfers to deviations of national economic growth from the EMU average. Under 
such mechanisms, the countries which have structurally lower growth rates than 
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others would tend to receive positive transfers much of the time. The ESF does not 
exhibit this feature, as its unique role is to cushion short-term cyclical fluctuations 
rather than promote economic convergence between euro-area member countries. 
From this point of view, the ESF could be seen as complementary to those mechanisms 
designed to promote the gradual convergence of the euro member countries’ economic 
situation, such that proposed by Drèze & Durré (2013).  
•  The ESF assistance would be temporary, as low economic growth would also reduce 
long-term real economic growth and thus the level of potential future disbursements 
from the ESF.  
•  Euro-area member countries would have to continue to fully respect the requirements 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which would be more difficult to do if they 
pursue unsound economic and fiscal policies. Along the lines suggested by Van 
Rompuy (2012), consideration could be given to developing the ESF within a 
framework that would modulate the transfers from the ESF to on-going compliance 
with mutually-agreed commitments. Should this approach be applied, it would be 
important to build on clear and transparent rules to preserve the automatic nature of 
the ESF-based mechanism and avoid political bargaining over the amount of net 
contributions. For instance, one could consider increasing the amount of net 
contributions when the member country is sanctioned under the SGP procedure.  
Illustrative Scenario 
To illustrate the potential impact of the ESF, this section shows how such a mechanism 
would have worked since the start of EMU, using the above equation to calculate each 
member country’s annual net contributions to the ESF, in accordance with the following 
assumptions: α = 0.5, ye = the real GDP growth rate observed in the given year and y* is the 
average potential real GDP growth rate observed in 1999-2013.5 The significance of these 
assumptions is discussed in the next section.  
Chart 2 shows the annual total net contributions to the ESF. It can be noted that the ESF 
would have accumulated net assets totalling €230 billion up to and including 2008, whereas 
euro area countries would have benefitted from ESF disbursements totalling €431 billion in 
2009-2013, or 4.7% of euro area GDP. This would have led the ESF to borrow a total of €201 
billion since the creation of the euro, or 2.1% of the euro area GDP in 2012.  
                                                      
5 Annex 1 shows the data used for y*. In principle, the size of α should be determined to achieve a 
given level of stabilisation against normal fluctuations and severe downturns. Furceri & Zdzienicka 
(2013) focus on this aspect of the design of a supranational fiscal stabilisation mechanism.  6 | BERNARD DELBECQUE 
 
 
Chart 3 shows that southern European countries would have been net contributors to the 
ESF up to and including 2007, whereas northern European countries would have benefitted 
from ESF disbursements in 2002, 2003 and 2005.
6 The trend would have reversed in 2008. The 
economic rebound in 2010 and 2011 would not have been strong enough to prevent southern 
countries from benefitting from ESF disbursements. By contrast, northern countries would 
have contributed to the ESF during these two years.
7  
 
 
                                                      
6  Southern countries include Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain, whereas northern 
countries include Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
7 The estimated net contributions per country are shown in Annex 2. Among other things, it can be 
seen that all countries would have received ESF payments during some years and made net 
contributions to the ESF during other years. In 2009, the ESF disbursements would have averaged 
3.5% of GDP.  
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Chart 4 illustrates the potential macroeconomic stabilisation impact of the ESF by comparing 
the real GDP growth rates observed in the euro area (y) with the growth rates of real GDP 
corrected by the level of net contributions to the ESF (y – d). It is apparent that the ESF 
would have had a strong smoothing effect on economic growth, particularly in periods of 
strong growth and economic downturn. Annex 3 illustrates the growth smoothing effect of 
the ESF for eight member countries.  
 
Chart 5 illustrates the effectiveness of the ESF as a macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism 
by showing its impact on the euro area budget deficit, assuming that the budget deficits after 
net contributions to the ESF would have been the observed deficits. This implies that during 
an economic downturn, the ESF payments would have allowed member countries to reduce 
their austerity effort by an amount equivalent to the ESF payments. Conversely, member 
countries would have reduced their fiscal stimuli by an amount equivalent to their 
contributions to the ESF in good years.  
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Implementation Issues 
The above results show how the ESF would have worked if real GDP growth had been 
estimated correctly each year as part of the annual budget process and if an agreement had 
been reached to use the long-term real GDP growth rates shown in Annex 1. These are 
simplifying assumptions that would need to be adapted for the ESF to work effectively. 
The first simplification, i.e. when economic forecast errors are ignored, has a smaller impact 
than one might think. Chart 6 compares the observed real GDP growth rate in the euro area 
in year T with the estimations made by the European Commission in the fall of year T-1 and 
year T.8 Whereas the discrepancies between the observed growth rates and the growth rates 
estimated one year in advance tend to be significant, the growth rates estimated in the fall of 
year T are very close to the observed rates.  
 
Implementing the ESF would also require estimating long-term real GDP growth rates. Such 
estimates are difficult to calculate. Being unobservable, long-term real GDP growth can only 
be derived from a purely statistical approach or a full econometric analysis, and in both 
cases, some arbitrary assumptions must be made to generate the estimations. Given the 
major uncertainty surrounding these assumptions, significant historical revisions can take 
place. If there is no agreement to use historical averages as in the above illustrative scenario,9 
an analytical framework for estimating long-term real GDP would need to be developed in 
line with recent OECD research on long-term economic growth in individual countries (see 
in particular Johansson, 2013).  
An alternative approach would be to replace (ye – y*) by the expected output gap in the 
equation used to calculate the net contributions to the ESF.10 The advantage of this approach 
is that the output gap is being used as an essential ingredient of the surveillance process 
                                                      
8 The estimations made in the fall of year T and T-1 can be found on the Commission’s website at the 
following  address: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/forecasts_en.htm.  
9 Furceri & Zdzienicka (2013) use growth deviations from historical averages to assess a supranational 
fiscal stabilisation mechanism.  
10  Annex 4 shows the total net contributions to the ESF calculated on the basis of the current 
estimations of the output data for 1999-2013. 
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(in percent) 
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Estimation in Fall of year T-1 Estimation in Fall of year t Observed
Source: Ameco and DG ECFIN European Economy ForecastPROPOSAL FOR A STABILISATION FUND FOR THE EMU | 9 
 
supporting the SGP. For this reason, the EU’s Economic Policy Committee has a dedicated 
w o r k i n g  g r o u p  ( t h e  O u t p u t  G a p s  W o r k i n g  G r o u p )  t h a t  i s  m a n d a t e d  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  
technically robust and transparent potential output and output gap indicators are used in the 
context of the SGP. The group’s work in this area led to the adoption of a new methodology 
for measuring potential output in 2009 (see D’Auria, 2010).  
The main drawback of using output gap estimates is that they are subject to historical 
revisions. This is illustrated in the Chart 7, which compares the output gap data for the euro 
area that were originally estimated in the fall of year T with the most recent output gap data. 
It can be observed that the output gaps originally estimated in 2001-08 were significantly 
underestimated, reflecting an overly-optimistic view of the potential growth rates of euro-
area countries. Hence, if the net contributions to the ESF had been calculated on the basis of 
these output gap estimates, they would have been underestimated.  
 
In order for the ESF to become reality, it will also be necessary to agree on a procedure to 
calculate the net contributions as accurately as possible and to deal with forecast errors. 
Concretely, the procedure could operate as follows. A first estimation of the net 
contributions would be made in year T-1, at the time of the preparation of the following 
year’s budget, on the basis of the growth forecast for year T. The net contributions would be 
updated in the course of year T on the basis of the revisions of the economic growth forecasts 
during the budget control exercises. In general, this procedure should allow the calculation 
of the net contributions to be based on realistic estimates of real GDP growth rates. If errors 
are detected in year T+1, it could be agreed that the amount of net contributions for year T+1 
could be adjusted in order to take the errors into account. The same principle could apply if 
the estimated long-term real GDP growth rates are revised in year T+1. For growth estimates 
revised after more than one year, it could be agreed that the net contributions are not 
recalculated, so as to avoid moving towards a situation in which the amount of net 
contributions could be more influenced by corrections of past forecast errors than by the 
countries’ cyclical positions. 
Conclusion 
EMU is the first monetary union where monetary policy is decided at the central level and 
fiscal policy is carried out at the member state level. The current economic downturn 
Chart 7: Euro Area Output Gap 
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confirms that this type of monetary union is not optimal. Given that the creation of a fully-
fledged fiscal union is not politically feasible at present, a more modest approach to help 
EMU members mitigate the impact of economic shocks is proposed.  
The proposal outlined in this paper aims at equipping the euro area with a rules-based 
mechanism that would increase the resilience of member countries to economic shocks, 
without requiring the establishment of a central authority. All countries could benefit from 
this mechanism sooner or later, and no country could expect permanent and unidirectional 
transfers in its favour.  
To move forward with this proposal, euro-area member countries would need to accept the 
principle of paying an ‘insurance premium’ in periods of strong growth if they are to benefit 
from financial transfers in tough economic times. They should also agree that the ESF may 
borrow on the financial markets when needed. Agreement of these points would confirm 
member countries’ sense of responsibility – they would accept the need to finance the ESF 
themselves rather than hoping to receive assistance if they run into difficulties – and 
pragmatism – the debt that the ESF could potentially accumulate would remain extremely 
limited in relation to the euro area’s GDP. Finally, it will be necessary to decide what would 
be the best indicator of euro-area countries’ position in the business cycle. To address this 
problem, the European Council could ask the Output Gaps Working Group to compare the 
pros and cons of different indicators of cyclical positions.  
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Annex 1. Average Potential Real Growth  
The chart below shows the long-term real GDP growth rates used in the illustrative scenario. 
 
 
Annex 2. Net Contributions to the ESF per Euro-Area Country 
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99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Belgium  1.0 1.0 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0 . 80 . 10 . 50 . 6-0.3 -2.2 0.4 0.1 -0.9 -0.8
Germany  0.3 0.9 0.1 -0.6 -0.8 -0.1 -0.3 1.2 1.0 -0.1 -3.2 1.4 0.9 -0.3 -0.5
Estonia  -2.1 2 . 91 . 21 . 31 . 91 . 22 . 53 . 11 . 8-4.0 -9.0 -0.3 2.2 -0.3 -0.4
Ireland  3.7 3.6 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 -2.9 -4.5 -2.2 -1.1 -1.3 -1.3
Greece  0.8 1.4 1.2 0.8 2.1 1.3 0.3 1.9 0.9 -1.0 -2.4 -3.4 -4.4 -4.1 -3.0
Spain  1.3 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 -0.6 -3.0 -1.2 -0.9 -1.8 -1.8
France  0.9 1.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 0 . 50 . 10 . 50 . 4-0.8 -2.3 0.1 0.1 -0.8 -0.8
Italy  0.4 1.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.4 0 . 50 . 10 . 80 . 5-0.9 -3.1 0.5 -0.1 -1.5 -1.0
Cyprus  1.3 1.4 0.9 0.0 -0.1 1 . 00 . 91 . 01 . 50 . 7-2.0 -0.4 -0.8 -2.3 -5.4
Luxembourg  2.6 2.6 -0.4 0.4 -0.8 0 . 61 . 00 . 91 . 7-2.0 -3.7 -0.2 -0.8 -1.5 -1.2
Malta  1.0 2.2 -1.1 0.2 -0.7 -1.2 0.7 0.2 1.0 0.9 -2.4 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4
Netherlands  1.5 1.1 0.1 -0.8 -0.7 0 . 30 . 20 . 91 . 10 . 1-2.7 0.0 -0.3 -1.3 -1.2
Austria  0.8 0.9 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5 0 . 40 . 30 . 90 . 9-0.2 -2.8 0.1 0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Portugal  1.6 1.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.9 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.5 -1.9 0.5 -1.3 -2.1 -1.7
Slovenia  1.4 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.2 1.0 0.8 1.7 2.3 0.5 -5.1 -0.6 -0.9 -2.4 -2.2
Slovakia  -2.0 -1.3 -0.3 0 . 30 . 40 . 51 . 32 . 23 . 20 . 9-4.5 0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -1.5
Finland  0.8 1.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0 . 90 . 31 . 11 . 5-1.0 -5.4 0.5 0.3 -1.2 -1.0
Average 0.9 1.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.2 -0.7 -3.5 -0.2 -0.4 -1.4 -1.5
 (*) Estimations underlying the results presented in the illustrative scenario
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Annex 3. ESF Macroeconomic Stabilisation Impact 
The charts below highlight the macroeconomic impact that the ESF could have had in a 
selected group of euro area member countries. 
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Annex 4. Total Net Contributions to the ESF Calculated on Output Gap Data 
The charts below show the total net contributions to the ESF calculated on the basis of the 
current estimations of the output data for 1999-2013. 11   Whilst the evolution of the 
contributions is similar to that presented in Charts 2 and 3, there are differences that reflect 
the fact that the output gap tends to adjust to changes in real GDP growth rates more slowly 
than growth deviations from historical averages. Indeed, after a negative (positive) shock, 
the real GDP growth rate needs to increase above (below) its long-term level to eliminate the 
output gap. The southern countries would have been the main beneficiaries from the 
increase in total net contributions.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
11 d = 0.5 (output gap), where d is the net contribution expressed as a percentage of GDP and the 
output gap data are taken from the European Commission’s database (Ameco).  
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